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ABSTRACT
This paper takes as the focus of its examination a 
particular form of racial conflict. That conflict can be 
seen as one of interpretation. The working premise is that 
racial or ethnic heritage influences the interpretation of 
language and events; the meaning that we find in any 
"text" —  written, spoken, or lived —  is not the inherent 
content of that text but rather an interpretation, a 
reading, that is affected by the racial perspective from 
which we observe the text. To explore this point, the paper 
borrows from recent studies in interpretative theory 
developed in literary and social criticism.
This form of racial conflict is examined in a 
particular context: the predominantly white, racially 
integrated American university. This paper examines 
paradigmatic incidents of racial tension in which a 
conscious, malicious intent is not the source the problem. 
Rather, this paper argues the problem arises from 
conflicting interpretations of an action or event, and that 
interpretations conflict because they originate from 
significantly different racial experiences.
Finally, this paper examines the social power structure 
of predominantly white universities to explain how students 
of minority racial groups, whose interpretations of events 
do not underlie institutional structures, are harmed by 
racial conflict. It offers some tentative proposals for 
revising institutional life to alleviate this harm.
v
RACISM AND RACE RELATIONS IN THE UNIVERSITY
1INTRODUCTION
"White students say, ’[the university] is great; it's 
awesome'. . . . But I just want to get my education and get 
out of here. This is their place, not mine."
— black student at a major state 
university, interviewed in wake of 
incidents of racial harassment and 
violence on campus1
"It bothers us that we have to defend ourselves against 
racism when we know we are not racist."
— white student at a major state 
university, responding to 
complaints that his fraternity's 
poster was racially offensive2
American universities in recent years have endured a 
resurgence in racial tensions on their campuses, and the 
problem has manifested itself often in startlingly blatant 
racist incidents. At the same time, people of color 
continue to experience a racism that takes more subtle and 
elusive forms than in earlier eras, a racism that no longer 
manifests itself simply in the appearance of "white only" 
signs, and the utterance of epithets such as "n-gger." It 
is a racism that is a persistent and constituent part of the
1 Wilkerson, Campus Blacks Feel Racism's Nuances, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 17, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
2 Cavalier Daily (University of Virginia student 
newspaper), Oct. 4, 1988, at 1.
2social order, woven into the fabric of society and everyday 
life. Professor Lawrence has suggested that this aspect of 
racism is "in large part a product of the unconscious" that 
is "arises from the assumptions we have learned to make 
about the world, ourselves, and others as well as from the 
patterns of our fundamental social activities."3 It is a 
racism frequently less intentional, and very often— to white 
people— less obvious. But its victims insist that it is no 
less real, harmful, or in need of remedy.4
Confrontation of such racism has led to debate over the 
very definition of racism. Consideration of the issue, 
however, has also engendered a significant "backlash," 
premised on the assertion that all the racism that needs to 
be eradicated has been; that we have gone too far in 
recognizing, and still pay too much attention to, a 
phenomenon that is no longer a problem. The argument is 
even extended to contend that the continuing remedial 
efforts themselves have become the problem, as has the 
overuse of the label "racism."5
3 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 3 9 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 33 0 
(1987) .
4 See Wilkerson, supra note 1, § 1, at 34, col. 4 (survey 
of students at the University of Maryland revealed two-thirds of 
white students were unaware of racial incidents on their campus, 
but 80% of black students knew of such incidents).
5 See M. Omi & H. Winant, Racial Formation in the United 
States 1-6 (1986); id. at 109-35 (focusing attention on three 
main "currents" of reactionary and conservative tendencies in the 
1980's that share the "similar ambition" of "discredit[ing] the
3The conflict over racism's form and existence 
implicates the entrenched American belief in equality of 
opportunity. The degree to which we believe in the 
existence of equality of opportunity informs
key ideas and objectives of the 1960fs minority movements"); id. 
at 71, 134 (noting recent definition of "reverse discrimination," 
and observing that the biggest reversals have taken place in 
affirmative action policies such that now it "is the liberals who 
are guilty of racism"); Trescott, Is Social Racism Now Becoming 
'Acceptable?', L.A. Times, June 12, 1981, § V, at 2, col. 1 
(observing that "the veiled insult, contempt masquerading as a 
joke, [and] the direct slur . . . [are being] recycled as a 
protest against minority gains") Kennedy, Persuasion and 
Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1327, 1344 (1986) (observing that the "Reagan 
Administration's policies reflect, reinforce, and capitalize on 
widespread feelings that blacks have received an undeserved 
amount of the nation's attention"); Kluegel, If There Isn't a 
Problem, You Don't Need a Solution: The Bases of Contemporary 
Affirmative Action Attitudes, 28 Am. Behav. Scientist 761, 770
(1985) (proposing that "whites will continue to believe that 
because they themselves are not prejudiced (in the traditional 
sense) and because racial prejudice seems to be diminishing in 
general, there is no longer a problem"); Abram, Affirmative 
Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1312
(1986) (arguing that the civil rights movement "should turn its 
attention back to first principles— the zealous regard for equal 
opportunity and the promotion of color-blind law and social 
policy— and away from color-conscious remedies that abandon 
principle and lead us further from a society free of the bane of 
racial discrimination").
One scholar asserts that some of the new subtle racism on 
campuses "may be due to 'whites hearing all year they are 
racists,'" while another argues that the "word 'racism' itself 
has become loaded . . . and is often used irresponsibly." School
Colors: Uneasy Gray Between Black and White, Christian Sci. 
Monitor, June 14, 1988, at 16-17 [hereinafter School Colors]; cf. 
Detlefsen, White Like Me: Racism 101 at Harvard, The New 
Republic, Apr. 10, 1989, at 18, 21 (criticizing a series of 
seminars on institutional racism at Harvard University and noting 
that "to the extent that the charge of 'racism' is repeatedly and 
gratuitously tossed about . . . there is a danger that the evil
of genuine racism will become trivialized and hence will be 
ignored").
4antidiscrimination law and the assessment of racism*s 
persistence, because truly equal opportunity would mean many 
social and economic disparities between racial groups are 
the result of something other than racism. If one assumes 
the existence of a functioning meritocracy, achievement and 
social condition are direct results of individual effort and 
ability. But if one sees the "thoroughly political— which 
is to say contestable— nature of *merit,*" then race becomes 
an appropriate and unavoidable consideration in that 
calculus.6
The dynamics of the problem of addressing racism and 
mediating race relations recur in universities across the 
country when students and faculty deal with racially tinged 
incidents, but an incident confronted by several University 
of Virginia law students serves as a paradigm. When 
students of color came together to complain to the 
administration about seemingly offensive remarks made in 
class by a professor, most white students in the class, as 
well as the professor himself, could find nothing offensive 
in the challenged remarks. Yet, black students (and some 
students of other races) were overwhelmingly offended.
Their options for recourse in the institution were few.
6 Kennedy, supra note 5, at 13 3 3; see Crenshaw, Race,
Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1380 (1988); 
Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1163, 
1199 (1988) (asserting that "[m]erit is a social construct that 
reflects a range of characteristics over which the individual has 
no control").
5Although the students were granted a few private meetings 
with the administration and an eventual brief apology, they 
faced the indignant denials (in the student newspaper and 
elsewhere) by many white students and the professor that 
anything offensive ever occurred, as well as angry 
chastisement for inaccurately alleging such injurious 
charges.7
To most white students in that debate, racism was 
defined as an act of intentional maliciousness; if the 
professor intended no racial offense (or at most, if the 
offense wasn't so obvious to white people that the professor 
should have noticed it), then none occurred. Black 
students, by contrast, had a completely different idea in 
mind: They sought to express their deep dissatisfaction with 
"the substantive dynamics of the classroom.1,8
7 See Prof's Alleged Remarks Prompt Petition, Va. L. Weekly 
(University of Virginia School of Law student newspaper), Apr.
15, 1988, at 1; Va. L. Weekly, Apr. 22, 1988, at 2, col. 1 
(student letter to editor expressing doubt that allegations of 
professor's discriminatory remarks were true, because student 
"never heard any discriminatory remarks from the man in his class 
last term"); id. at 3 (professor's open letter addressing 
specific allegations of racist and sexist remarks, commenting on 
each "incident" because professor felt he had "engaged in no 
conduct for which I need feel ashamed or apologetic"); id. at 5, 
col. 1 (letter from student observing that "many students (not 
just the minority students who receive affirmative action) are 
voicing concerns about the offensive statements"); id. at 1-2, 5- 
6 (letters declaring public petition initiated by several student 
organizations protesting professor's remarks to be "invidious,” 
"reckless," and offensive to "basic notions of fairness and due 
process").
8 Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in 
Legal Education, 11 Nat'1 Black L.J. 1, 2 (1988-89). As Crenshaw 
notes, "[i]n many instances, minority students' values, beliefs,
6One of the problems underlying such debates over racism 
is epistemological: How do we know '•racism”— what events, 
statements, behavior, and social conditions will "count" as 
racist? The definition of racism is a policy choice. The 
question of how we interpret— and whom we let interpret—  
social events and behavior in order to identify racism is 
the underlying struggle in the construction of our 
understanding of race.9
A related problem is the racial distribution of power 
in carrying on such debates, and in institutional life 
generally. The power to define racism, and more generally 
to determine what issues will be discussed in terms of race, 
is prerequisite to the power to shape institutional life. 
Thus, if universities will not acknowledge race as a 
relevant issue in any incidents except blatantly intentional
and experiences clash not only with those of their classmates but 
also with those of their professors." Id. at 2.
9 See M. Omi & H. Winant, supra note 5, at 57-66. The 
authors observe that "race has been a matter of political 
contention," id. at 57, "a pre-eminently sociohistorical concept. 
Racial categories and the meaning of race are given concrete 
expression by the specific social relations and historical 
context in which they are embedded." Id. at 60. Further, the 
"seemingly obvious, 'natural' and 'common sense' qualities which 
the existing racial order exhibits themselves testify to the 
effectiveness of the racial formation process in constructing 
racial meanings and racial identities." Id. at 62.
For a related argument on the struggle to define 
"desegregation," cf. Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of 
Meaning, in Shades of Brown: New Perspectives on School 
Desegregation 31 (D. Bell ed. 1980) [hereinafter Shades of Brown] 
(proposing that the changing meaning of terms such as 
"desegregation" is "merely the surface of larger issues" such as 
the question of what place blacks should have in American 
society).
ones, issues such as the substantive dynamics of classrooms 
for students of color will be ignored, and the discomfort 
black students experience in many white-dominated classrooms 
will be denied.
As racist incidents and tensions have increased on 
college campuses in recent years, university 
administrations, state governments, and student and civil 
rights groups have searched for ways to combat racism in the 
university, as well as to improve campus racial climates. 
Ad-hoc student groups frequently have formed on individual 
campuses to combat racist incidents. A network of many such 
groups from colleges in the Northeast met at Yale University 
in the spring of 1988 to form the organization Campuses 
Against Racial Violence and establish a databank on racial 
incidents. State government and university administration 
officials gathered for two conference on racial and ethnic 
relations in higher education. At the same time, there is a 
seeming lack cf recognition among some higher education 
officials that racist incidents occur on their campuses,
even as reports of such incidents recur in the popular
10press. u
10 See Grasso, Racism on Campuses Discussed at Conference, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1988, § 23 (Connecticut Weekly), at 6, col.
5. Among government agencies and private groups that have 
gathered data and studied the issue of racism on campus are the 
National Institute against Prejudice and Violence, the Southern 
Regional Education Board, and the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.
The New Jersey Department of Higher Education surveyed State 
Higher Education Executive Officials (SHEEO's) in every state 
about racial incidents occurring on their college campuses.
8This thesis aims to provide a description of racial 
dynamics on college campuses that will illuminate why 
institutional responses are needed to address racism, in its 
elusive and controversial forms as well as its blatant ones. 
First, the goal is to document that racism on campus is real 
and substantial enough to require a remedy. Second, it is 
to argue that while sanctions against racist actions and 
speech, crafted within the parameters of current 
antidiscrimination law, can be helpful, a more fundamental 
restructuring of the institutional arrangements on 
integrated campuses may be the only way to ease racial 
tensions on such campuses. Underlying this thesis' analysis 
is the assertion that the problem of combating racism on 
campus is not simply a question of correcting individual 
racist attitudes or punishing racist behavior versus 
protecting free expression; it is also a question of whose 
expression will be empowered by institutional structures, 
and whether all racial groups will be allotted equal 
institutional power within universities.
Sixteen states reported no racial incidents in the last three 
years, and another 11 did not respond to that question on the 
survey. Yet, incidents of violence or allegations of racial 
prejudice, occurring in the spring of 1988 alone, were reported 
in the popular press in 10 of those 27 states. See Marcus, 
State-Level Efforts to Improve Racial/Ethnic Harmony on Campus 19 
tables 1 & 2 (1989) (unpublished paper available from the Office 
of Institutional Affairs, New Jersey Department of Higher 
Education).
Marcus concludes from the survey that SHEEOs exhibit a 
tendency to underreport the incidence of racial tension, and that 
"it is clear that the number of incidents cited by the SHEEOs in 
the survey does not approach their actual level." Id. at 19-20.
9To that end, this thesis works from the realization 
that injury results not only from intentional racism, but 
also from conceptual, aversive, or unconscious racism and 
from the inevitable clash of perspectives among racial 
groups. Part I of this thesis briefly summarizes a 
sociology of knowledge, in order to introduce the 
perspective that the thesis utilizes on how we come to know 
and use abstract concepts such as racism in our 
interpretation of social events. Part II examines how a 
history of racism pervades understandings of social life 
because it has pervaded the lived experience of social life; 
this Part examines how our history of racism affects the 
things that we perceive as racism. Part III places such 
arguments in the context of the university setting, 
presenting a description of the contemporary academy that 
indicates the extent and effect of racism there and 
emphasizing the need for additional remedies. Part IV 
surveys remedial possibilities for universities as they 
formulate policies for addressing the problem of racism in 
the university setting.
10
I. RACISM AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Even in the wake of anti-objectivist critiques, there 
persists throughout the sciences, humanities, and law a 
faith in the objective meaning of language and social 
events. Despite modernism's undermining of the faith in 
authoritative values and foundations that would allow us a 
constant framework within which to understand social life 
across time and context, people have difficulty 
relinquishing the Platonic belief that they can get to the 
true, real essence of things if they only look hard enough. 
One epistemological assumption of that belief is that the 
meaning of words and texts exists prior to their 
interpretation by individuals, that such words and texts 
have inherent content that is discerned rather than created. 
Truth, in other words, is out there to be discovered, and 
knowledge is "looked upon as the instrument by which to take 
possession of the Absolute."11
11 Hegel: The Essential Writings 44 (F. Weiss ed. 1974).
Traditional epistemology, which is the study of the nature 
of knowledge, entails "belief in the existence of transcendent, 
objective truth," Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of 
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 429, 430 (1987). Professor Williams adopts Wittgenstein's 
label of the "picture theory" to refer to the traditional 
Platonic, objectivist view that language provides a picture of 
reality. Id. at 433-34 & n.21. According to this view, "human 
understanding is reached when language captures the 'glassy 
essence,' the [Platonic] Form, of a particular object. For 
example, the word 'tree' links an actual tree with the essence of 
what it means to be a Tree." Id. at 434 (footnotes omitted).
11
Likewise, meaning in social life is experienced as 
fixed, objective, or "really there" because our language, 
texts, and modes of behavior are "reified." Our language 
and social practice construct and institutionalize what we 
think of as "obvious," "common sense," and "natural."12
When this way of thinking is applied to the problem of
The picture theory, then, "can be seen as a search for 
foundations. The core Platonic impulse was . . . the need for 
human knowledge, perceptions, and values to achieve the kind of 
absolute certainty characteristic (so it was believed) of 
mathematical truth in general, and of Euclidean geometry in 
particular." Id. (footnotes omitted).
12 [R]eification is the apprehension of the products of
human activity as if they were something else than 
human products— such as facts of nature, results of 
cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will . . . .  
The reified world . . .  is experienced by man as a 
strange facticity, an o p u s  alienum over which he has no 
control rather than as the o p u s  proprium of his own 
productive activity.
P. Berger & T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality 82-83 
(1966); cf. M. Omi & H. Winant, supra note 5, at 57-66 (arguing 
that many racial theories seek "to remove the concept of race 
from fundamental social, political, or economic determination," 
and suggest instead "that the truth of race lies in the terrain 
of innate characteristics").
See Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term— Foreword: Justice 
Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 11-15 (1987). Professor Minow 
observes that each year the Supreme Court and the nation itself 
confront dilemmas of difference in a heterogeneous society that 
arise out of "powerful unstated assumptions about whose point of 
view matters," assumptions that "work in part through the very 
structure of our language, which embeds the unstated points of 
comparison inside categories that bury their perspective and 
wrongly imply a natural fit with the world." Id. at 13. She 
argues that "[l]egal treatment of difference thus tends to treat 
as unproblematic the point of view from which difference is seen, 
assigned, or ignored, rather than acknowledging that the problem 
of difference can be described and understood from multiple 
points of view." Id. at 14. In this regard, "[e]xisting 
institutions and language already carve the world and already 
express and recreate attitudes about what counts as a difference, 
and who or what is the relevant point of comparison." Id. at 15.
12
racism, people start from the assumption that a phrase or 
event either is or is not racist, because racism either is 
or is not the inherent, positive content of the phrase. 
Disputes about meaning can degenerate into something like, 
"you say a remark is racist, but I know it is really not. 
If you understood its meaning correctly, you would 
agree.1,13
Once one abandons traditional epistemology, the 
question of which social forces most influence the 
institutionalization of language and social experience
13 Professor Fish explains the broader problem:
[S]hared understanding is the basis of the confidence 
with which [people] speak and reason, but its 
categories are their own only in the sense that as 
actors within an institution they automatically fall 
heir to the institution's way of making sense, its 
systems of intelligibility. That is why it is so hard 
for someone whose very being is defined by his position 
within an institution . . .  to explain to someone 
outside it a practice or a meaning that seems to him to 
require no explanation, because he regards it as 
natural. Such a person, when pressed, is likely to
say, "but that's just the way it's done" . . . .
Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, reprinted in H. Adams & L. 
Searle, Critical Theory Since 1965, at 525, 532 (1986).
Berger and Luckmann note that there are certain "social 
circumstances that favor dereification," that is, that make it 
easier for one within an institution to see the contingent 
construction of the social order instead of seeing it only as
"the way it's done." Such circumstances include "the overall
collapse of institutional orders, the contact between previously 
segregated societies, and the important phenomenon of social 
marginality." P. Berger & T. Luckmann, supra note 12, at 85 
(footnote omitted). The last two circumstances are particularly 
relevant for understanding American racism, because whites and 
blacks have had vastly different experiences under racist 
practices and ideologies. Whites in particular have little 
knowledge of how blacks' understanding of the social world is 
affected by that experience.
13
becomes crucial; it leads to the examination of the 
relationship between knowledge and power. Reliance on 
community agreement— e.g., "since so many people agree that 
the remark is not racist, it must not be"— begs the question 
of the community’s composition.14
The communities that impose the prevailing 
understanding and interpretation of racism, particularly in 
the university, are clearly skewed in their membership.
Major universities are dominated in their administrations, 
faculties, and student bodies by whites— and 
disproportionately those born into the comfortable classes. 
One purpose of this thesis is to show that the way 
universities as institutions understand racism is affected 
by the composition of their membership, that such an effect 
underlies the institutional perpetuation or toleration of 
racism, and that such an effect is unavoidable because 
understandings of race vary according to the historical 
experience and current social position of racial groups.
If we acknowledge the divisions within a community, 
then consensus over what that community constructs as its 
shared assumptions becomes problematic. It is likely to be 
a consensus among only parts— the most powerful parts— of
14 Berger and Luckmann reason that "[i]f the integration of 
an institutional order can be understood only in terms of the 
’knowledge' that its members have of it, it follows that the 
analysis of such 'knowledge1 will be essential for an analysis of 
the institutional order in question." P. Berger & T. Luckmann, 
supra note 12, at 61.
14
the community. In such a case, the presuppositions that 
serve as the unacknowledged starting points for 
interpretation are exercises of social power by the groups 
able to put them in place. With particular attention 
focused upon the university setting, this thesis suggests 
that on the issue of race, we must examine the history of 
"racial formation" and the ideologies growing out of it, in 
order to understand how differing racial identities and 
histories affect the interpretive understanding of— and 
remedial efforts to address— the problem of contemporary 
racism.15
15 See M. Omi and H. Winant, supra note 5, passim.
Removing the implication of conspiracy, presuppositions that form 
the prevailing parameters around the issue of racism begin to 
look like Gramsci's notion of ideological hegemony. See 
generally J. Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, 
Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process 23-60 (1981) 
(discussing Gramsci's doctrine of ideological ascendancy or 
"hegemony," essentially grounded in the idea that the dominant 
class must establish its own moral, political, and cultural 
values as the conventional norms of practical behavior).
The hermeneutic strategy of study proposed here presupposes 
the inability to discover the "deep structure" of "what's really 
going on"; this is a necessary concession to abandoning truth as 
positive content. Rather, the strategy is a never-ending 
interpretive effort to get within a community (or text) and 
understand it on its own terms, as well as assess it from various 
points outside the system. The strategy borrows from the process 
of the "hermeneutic circle," see, e.g., R. Bernstein, Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis 131- 
39 (1983), but departs from versions of that process that claim 
to result in a final, determinant understanding.
The same project could be done with forms of racism other
than American black-white relations, and for gender
discrimination. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 6, at 1191 (noting
that the "same biases . . . that disadvantage women also operate
against minorities")? Weiss & Melling, The Legal Education of 
Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988) (analyzing why many 
women find law school alienating).
15
II. RACISM AS AN INFLUENCE ON INTERPRETATION
A. Historical Origins
Racism so pervades our social history and cultural 
experience that it has fundamentally shaped our collective 
unconscious, with the result that "a large part of the 
behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced 
by unconscious racial motivation.11 As Professor Lawrence 
has suggested, racism can be understood as an "illness 
[that] affects almost everyone," but it might help to think 
of racism in a less aberrational sense as well. One's race 
gives one, almost unnoticeably, a perspective on racial 
issues different from people of other races. Such 
unconscious racial perspectives affect our definition and 
recognition of racism.16
The disparity in perceptions between blacks and whites 
on issues of race continues to result in blacks and whites 
assessing incidents— even well-known public events— in 
radically different terms. Judge Higginbotham, for
16 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 321-22; see also Brooks, 
Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School Personnel Process: Toward 
an Understanding of Racial Mindsets, 5 J. L. and Inequality 1, 8-
11 (1987). Professor Brooks argues that whites generally think 
of racism as intentional belief in white supremacy, but that 
because "the state of mind of one who perpetuates minority 
subordination makes little difference to those who suffer from 
minority subordination— i.e., minorities— racism is defined by 
minorities to include minority subordination." Id. at 9.
16
instance, has contrasted the "predominantly white
perspective" on the Declaration of Independence as "the
greatest achievement in the history of man" with Frederick
Douglass* famous remarks on that document:
This Fourth of July is yours. not mine. You may 
rejoice, I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters to the 
grand illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon him 
to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and 
sacrilegious irony. . . .  I am not included within the 
pale of this glorious anniversary . . . .17
The history of racism helps to develop, and in turn is
perpetuated by, a shared psychology and culture of which
racially affected ideology is a constituent part. One
blatant aspect is a persistent set of images, myths, and
stereotypes that historically constituted white and black
racial identities: industrious/lazy,
intelligent/unintelligent, moral/immoral, enabling
culture/disabling culture, law-abiding/criminal,
responsible/shiftless, virtuous/lascivious. As Michael Omi
and Howard Winant have explained, "[r]acial beliefs operate
as an 'amateur biology,* a way of explaining the variations
in 'human nature.1" Our society tends "to view race as
something fixed and immutable— something rooted in 'nature.1
Thus we mask the historical construction of racial
categories, the shifting meaning of race."18
17 A. Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color 5 (1978).
18 M. Omi & H. Winant, supra note 5, at 62-64 (footnote 
omitted). The list is taken largely from Crenshaw, supra note 6, 
at 1373. A more complete development of these traditional race 
characterizations appears in J. Kovel, White Racism: A
17
The traditional formulation of racial identities serves 
to perpetuate what Professor Crenshaw terms a "white race 
consciousness" that "legitimates prevailing injustices and 
constrains the development of new solutions that benefit 
Black Americans." Crenshaw traces the transformation of 
this consciousness into the unconscious "white norm" that is 
taken as a neutral standard even after the demise of 
explicit white supremacy ideology.19
White race consciousness, experienced as neutral and 
practiced without malicious intent, defines whites' 
interpretation of racism and social life. Black Americans' 
understanding of race is similarly defined by historical
Psychohistory 51-92 (1970).
For a related discussion of the development of ideologies of 
racial identities, see M. Omi & H. Winant, supra note 5, at 57- 
69. For an explanation of the human tendency to create 
irrational categories of racial and ethnic characteristics, see 
G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 17-27 (1954). This landmark 
study also provides excellent analyses and theoretical 
explanations from a psychological perspective of the preferential 
thinking, creation and perception of group differences, as well 
as sociocultural factors that are part of the complex process of 
forming prejudices.
19 Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1369. She elaborates:
The white norm . . . has only been submerged in popular 
consciousness. It continues in an unspoken form as a 
statement of the positive social norm, legitimating the 
continuing domination of those who do not meet it. Nor 
have the negative stereotypes associated with Blacks 
been eradicated. The rationalizations once used to 
legitimate Black subordination based on a belief in 
racial inferiority have now been reemployed to 
legitimate the domination of Blacks through reference 
to an assumed cultural inferiority.
Id. at 1379.
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experience? neither is neutral. Yet, one conception will be 
inevitably privileged in that it will be utilized as the 
basis for understanding and acting against racism, as well 
as serving as the basis for understanding written texts, 
legal doctrine, and social life generally.
Professor Wasserstrom provides an example of the way 
such "conceptual racism operated in Brown v. Board of 
Education. He argues that, logistically, most school 
districts could have been integrated within a few days of 
the Court’s decision. Most counties had two high schools, 
one white and one black, and ”[t]here was nothing difficult 
about deciding that— as of the day after the decision— half 
of the children . . . who lived in the southern part of the 
county . . . would go to [one high school] and all those who 
lived in the northern half would go to [the other]." Yet 
the Court justified its order of desegregation "with all 
deliberate speed," by citing "problems related to 
administration, arising from the physical condition of the 
school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, 
revision of school districts . . . and revision of local 
laws."20
Wasserstrom's point is that administrative problems (in 
many places) could be easily handled, and building 
conditions were only a problem because the Court could not
20 See Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential 
Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 581, 599- 
601 (1977); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
envision ordering white children to attend school in the 
same substandard facilities black students had endured. The 
Supreme Court allowed an infamously slow remedial process 
because of an unacknowledged conclusion that white students 
could not be made to attend inferior black schools. Until 
all schools could be upgraded, black students would have to 
(continue to) endure inferior facilities. Because black 
lives were implicitly valued less than white ones, the Court 
ignored the more obviously just intermediate remedy: 
ordering white students, who had long had the benefit of 
better facilities, to use the inferior ones while black 
students, who had unconstitutionally been relegated to the 
poor schools for generations, gain the temporary benefit of 
better facilities. Yet to the Court, leaving students in 
current facilities until all schools were improved seemed 
neutral.21
B. Implications of Interpretation Through Race 
Consciousness
Our society has established a national consensus 
against blatant, intentional racism, and in the decades
21 An obvious factor— no doubt considered by the Court—  
complicates Wasserstrom's thesis. Immediate integration simply 
would not have been carried out by local officials, and it might 
not have been enforced by the executive branch. Also, such a 
decision certainly would have ignited violent resistance from 
some whites. The Court was at the limits of its institutional 
powers. While this point may undermine Wasserstrom's assertion 
about the ease of immediate integration, it does not affect his 
insight that black children's experience was valued less than 
white children's.
20
since Brown v. Board of Education has developed a sizable 
set of legal remedies to address it. Even when remedial 
mechanisms do not reach such racism— as, for instance, when 
black people cannot win tort actions for intentional racial 
slurs— we at least have the conceptual apparatus to 
recognize that racism exists.22
We have no such recognition, however, for more subtle 
racism— the unconscious, usually unintentional racial bias 
that infects the taken-for-granted concepts, categories, and 
assumptions with which we make sense of the world. Law and 
much of our social discourse recognize racism only in the 
form of an overt expression of white racial superiority and 
deliberate efforts to denigrate, segregate, or deny 
opportunity on the basis of skin color. The law and popular 
understanding have incorporated into the idea of racism 
neither contemporary descriptions of the psychology of 
unconscious racism nor recent theoretical thinking that has 
displaced traditional epistemology with a debate over 
hermeneutic approaches. Neither have they acknowledged the 
importance of racial identity— of one's membership in a 
distinct racial group rather than a colorblind "humankind"—  
in the interpretation of racism. The result is racism—  
aversive, conceptual, and unconscious— that cannot yet be
22 On tort actions for racial slurs, see Delgado, Words 
that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name- 
Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982).
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acknowledged, and thus not remedied.23
Yet while it is not acknowledged, it is often felt, 
even by whites. Many blacks inevitably feel an anxiety in 
predominantly white institutions even though the 
institutions are now integrated and formally neutral in 
matters of race. Some whites feel a collective guilt for 
the sins of the their ancestors, and for the dimly 
recognized possibility that their own social status is due 
partly to the historical subordination of blacks. 
Alternatively, some whites resent the expectation of guilt 
and feel no responsibility for racial tensions they did not 
intentionally cause. This mixture of emotions and attitudes 
can be the cause of awkward situations in which race issues 
arise in integrated groups, not only because an arguably 
offensive remark has been made, but because the tremendous 
disparity in the social histories of blacks and whites make 
efforts at empathy and understanding difficult, particularly 
for whites.24
23 Kovel defines the aversive racist as 11 [t]he type who 
believes in white race superiority and is more or less aware of 
it, but does nothing overt about it. An intrapsychic battle goes 
on between these sentiments and a conscience which seeks to 
repudiate them.” J. Kovel, supra note 18, at 54-55. On 
conceptual racism, see Wasserstrom, supra note 20. On 
unconscious racism, see Lawrence, supra note 3; Lawrence, 
"Justice” or "Just Us": Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 Stan. 
L. Rev. 831 (1983).
24 For a description of such an incident and a development 
of this argument, see Steele, I'm Black, You're White, Who's 
Innocent? Race and Power in an Era of Blame, Harper's Mag., June 
1988, at 45; Steele, The Recoloring of Campus Life, Harper's 
Mag., Feb. 1989, at 47, 53-55 [hereinafter Steele, Recoloring].
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Antidiscrimination law, and particularly equal
protection doctrine, is formulated explicitly to address
only intentional racism. Professor Freeman, in an
influential article, has called this approach the
"perpetrator perspective.” As he describes it:
[R]acial discrimination [is seen] as something that is 
caused by individuals, or individual institutions, 
producing discrete results that can be identified as 
discrimination and thereafter neutralized. . . . The 
perpetrator perspective . . . presupposes that apart 
from the misguided conduct of particular actors the 
rest of our society is working . . . .  All we need do 
is root out the villains. Having done so, we can say 
with confidence that it was all their fault.25
The landmark equal protection decision of Washington v.
Davis is exemplary in this respect. In Davis. the Court
ruled that state action is not unconstitutional "solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.” Rather,
discrimination "must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose." In other words, the perpetrator's
intent, and not the victim's injury, is the law's concern.
If an identical racial harm were caused unintentionally, the
equal protection clause would offer no remedy. The
principle was quickly extended by the Court to other equal
protection claims.26
25 Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contra­
diction, Rationalization, in Shades of Brown, supra note 9, at 
71, 74-75.
26 Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). For 
cases in which the Davis principle was extended, see, e.g.,
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (segregation 
of schools must be shown to be the intent of the school board); 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
23
Such a conception of racism might be adequate if 
perpetrators always made manifest a racist intent. But not 
only does such a theory privilege the perpetrator *s 
experience of racism over the victim's, it also does not 
begin to aid in recognizing more subtle, aversive racism.
The perpetrator perspective sheds no light on a situation in 
which a black person feels the injury of a racist remark or 
action, yet the white "perpetrator" intends or recognizes no 
racism. Concomitantly, the law's perpetrator perspective 
conceptualizes racism as a discrete and specific act, an act 
committed by one individual, group, or institution against 
another whose injury can be identified. It ignores the 
possibility that "race" is structural and interstitial, that 
it can be the root of injury even when not traceable to a 
specific intention or action.27
429 U.S. 252 (1977) (housing segregation must be racially 
motivated).
27 See Brooks, supra note 16, at 9-10 (noting that "whether 
the harm is backed by a racial animus does not change its 
existence or ameliorate the pain suffered by its victims," that 
"when individuals and institutions having 'good' intentions 
engage in a pattern or practice of granting low priority to 
matters of keen importance to minorities— such as real access to 
quality jobs, education, and housing— that is subordination and, 
hence, racism, as far as minorities are concerned" (footnote 
omitted)). Cf.. Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A 
Critique of the Model of Legal Protection, 12 Signs: J. Women in 
Culture & Society 421, 439 (1987) (concluding that "[t]hough 
antidiscrimination law may have produced positive social change, 
legal strategies put unacceptable burdens on disadvantaged groups 
with little promise of success"); Rhode, supra note 6, at 1193 
(observing that although "they have been effective against the 
most overt forms of gender discrimination, traditional equal 
opportunity frameworks have not confronted the deeper 
institutional and ideological forces that contribute to gender
24
A large body of sociological research on law has found 
overwhelming evidence that legal institutions discriminate 
against blacks in ways that cannot be explained on the facts 
of the cases or through legal doctrine. It is well known, 
for instance, that death penalty sentences are given more 
often to black defendants than to whites, and more often to 
the killers of white victims than to those of black victims. 
That racial disparity holds up across the handling of lesser 
crimes as well. Intentional prejudice cannot explain that 
data. But the realization that race affects thought and 
experience in things seemingly unrelated to race (such as 
whether a particular act constitutes an ,faggravating 
circumstance" sufficient to justify the death penalty over 
life imprisonment) sheds light on such disproportionate 
results.28
Such racism requires attention, for it is a
disadvantage").
28 See Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in 
Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 Crime and Delinquency 563 
(1980). Even under revised death penalty statutes approved by 
the United States Supreme Court, "race of both offender and 
victim ha[ve] a tremendous impact on the chances that death 
sentence would be handed down." Id. at 596-97. The 
discrepancies "have been extreme in magnitude, similar across 
states and under different statutory forms, pervasive over 
successive stages of the judicial process, and uncorrected by 
appellate review." Id. at 629. The death penalty is given most 
often in cases in which a black has killed a white, next most 
often when a white has killed a white, then when a black has 
killed a black, and least often when a white has killed a black. 
See D. Black, Sociological Justice 61 (1989). For data on lesser 
crimes, see D. Black, The Behavior of Law 17, 21-22, 24-25 
(1976) .
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manifestation and perpetuation of a race consciousness that 
results in real injury. White race consciousness informs 
and helps constitute the existing social conditions that 
whites are able to reconcile with processes of formal 
equality and the belief that racism is no longer a 
significant problem in the United States.
Outside the law, the absence of a recognition of race 
consciousness, which is in part an understanding of racism 
limited to the perpetrator perspective, helps to explain 
vocal resentment of whites to charges of racism and provides 
insight into allegations that the term "racism" has been so 
misused and overused that it has lost its meaning. When 
whites conceive of "racism" as requiring an intentional 
racist motive for which they deserve personal blame for a 
personal fault, they get angry because they know they had no 
racist intent. They plead that they were misunderstood, or 
that blacks are "oversensitive." As one white MIT student 
complained, '[h]alf my buddies on the [high school] football 
team were black, and I come here and read every other day in 
the paper that I'm a racist. It irritates me."29
This misunderstanding of the nature of racism is the 
basis of a problematic confrontation in black-white 
relations: a nonmalicious remark or action by a white person 
to which black people take offense or feel injury. A white 
speaker's reaction, in turn, is either uncomprehending
29 School Colors, supra note 5, at 17.
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puzzlement ("How could that possibly be seen as racist?") or 
some mixture of vocal denial and backlash ("I didn't mean 
any harm, and it angers me that you accuse me of it"). The 
dilemma hinges on differing interpretations of the cultural 
or symbolic value of social events.
Consider the debate over the Confederate flag. Black 
students at schools where white fans wave the flag and sing 
"Dixie" during football games see the Confederate emblems as 
symbols of an era in which their ancestors were enslaved by 
whites. Many white students, on the other hand, seem to 
take the flag as representative merely of their Southern 
heritage, a cultural identity distinct from Northern or 
urban lifestyles. Such whites do not see themselves as 
endorsing, through the flag, a return to slavery. They 
simply do not see what the big deal is about celebrating the 
Confederate flag once one concedes that violent racial 
subjugation is a bad thing. As defined by their intentions, 
many whites do not view their use of the Confederate flag as 
problematic. Nor is it made so by the banner's frequent 
appearance at Ku Klux Klan rallies —  or its use by white 
students at the Citadel as an act of defiance in the wake of 
a racial incident on campus.30
30 See, e.g., Aitken, Racism on Campus: Beyond the Citadel, 
People Mag., Dec. 15, 1986, at 58, 65-66 (recounting a Citadel 
football game where "brand-new rebel flags were waved defiantly 
by white students and alumni" three weeks after white students 
there dressed in white sheets had burned a cross in the room a 
black student; one alumnus observed that the action was 
tantamount to chanting "n-gger, n-gger"); The Stars and Bars Is
27
The problem is that white students interpret through 
the only lens of understanding they have available: a set of 
assumptions and metaphors, arising from a specific 
sociohistorical context, which constrains what 
interpretations will seem "obvious." Such constraints are 
contingent and could be ameliorated with a broad-based 
commitment that began with the recognition that such 
attitudes are racially based even when not racially 
motivated.
Not A Racist Symbol, Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1988, at A17, col. 1 
(justifying display of the flag).
Black groups have made efforts in recent years to have the 
Confederate flag removed from Southern state houses and other 
public buildings. See, e.g., Confederate Flag in Norfolk Draws 
Protests, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1988, at B2, col. 6 (reporting on 
an attempt to remove the flag from Norfolk City Council 
chambers); Hill, Symbol of Dixieland Has Blacks Seeing Red, Wash. 
Post, Jan. 15, 1988, at A3, col. 1; Eubanks, Ole Miss Is Still 
Torn 25 Years After Meredith, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1987, at Dl, 
col. 4, D2, col. 4 (Confederate flag for black students at Ole 
Miss "represented Mississippi's racist past" while for the writer 
it was a "harmless symbol of a bygone era").
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III. RACISM IN THE UNIVERSITY
A. The Evidence and Experience of Racism
Educational institutions have been a primary context in 
which the judicial system has grappled with the problem of 
remedies for the historical subordination of black people.
In many respects universities have equaled or surpassed 
other institutions in efforts to remedy the effects of past 
racism in a variety of ways, including affirmative action 
policies, minority scholarship programs, Afro-American and 
other non-European courses of study in the curriculum, and 
minority cultural centers on campuses. Nevertheless, 
universities exhibit the shortcomings of remedial efforts. 
Some universities have not met court orders for enrollment 
of minority students. Many do not have minority student 
bodies equivalent to the minority population of their 
states, and figures for minority faculty lag even further 
behind. Resistance to calls for curriculum revision 
persist.31
Race is peculiarly problematic in the context of higher 
education. In its most limited definition, to which many
31 Landmark antidiscrimination cases that arose educational 
institutions include Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 
(1955); Regents of the Univ. of Calif, v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978). On universities' efforts at integration, see Vobejda, 
School Integration: 4 States Pass, 6 Fail, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 
1988, at A3, col. 1.
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whites still subscribe, racism is an attitude held mostly by 
the unenlightened or uneducated, that is, an isolated 
position peculiar to the culture of Afrikaaners, some 
Southern state officials, or some working class white 
ethnics in the outer boroughs of New York. Given that 
definition, it is difficult to admit the presence of racism 
among society*s most sophisticated and intellectually 
gifted. And indeed, despite persistent problems, many 
blacks find college campuses better than many other white- 
dominated social spaces. Still, many black students 
experience campus life as a disturbing or even hostile 
atmosphere that at a minimum distracts attention and energy 
from academic pursuits.32
The university is also a singularly powerful 
institution in the distribution of wealth. Its primary 
products, credentials in the form of college degrees, are 
limited and valuable commodities. Most students, especially
32 Steele, Recoloring, supra note 24, at 47-48. Steele 
recalls:
When I went to college in the mid-Sixties, colleges 
were oases of calm and understanding in a racially 
tense society; campus life— with its traditions of 
tolerance and fairness, its very distance from the 
"real*1 world— imposed a degree of broadmindedness on 
even the most provincial students. If I met whites who 
were not anxious to be friends with blacks, most were 
at least vaguely friendly to the cause of our freedom. 
In any case, there was no guerilla activity against our
presence, no "mine field of racism'* (as one black 
student at Berkeley recently put it) to negotiate. I
wouldn't say that the phrase "campus racism" is a 
contradiction in terms, but until recently it certainly 
seemed an incongruence."
30
those ambitious enough to compete for admission to top- 
ranked schools, are aware of this fact. Those who go to 
college make more money, on average, than those who do not; 
those who graduate from elite institutions usually make more 
than those who earn diplomas from second- and third-tier 
schools. White students who believe that admissions 
criteria based on grades, test scores, and the status of 
one's high school are objective, fair and neutral indicia 
for college admissions resent scarce (and valuable) seats 
being filled by minority students admitted through 
affirmative action policies (though there is little 
opposition to affirmative action for athletes and children 
of alumni.) Both faith in the meritocratic processes that 
are supposed to govern the university's intellectual task 
and the self-interest that intensifies competition for the 
university's key commodity mesh with a particular racial 
ideology to contribute to questioning by whites of the 
legitimacy of black students' presence in academia. White 
acceptance of the ideology of equal opportunity and 
unproblematic meritocracy helps eliminate the need to see 
racism as a key factor in an economy and social structure 
that distributes rewards with tremendous disparity.33
33 See Wrong Message from Academe, Time, Apr. 6, 1987, at 
57 [hereinafter Academe] (statement of Adele Terrell, program 
director of the National Institute Against Prejudice and 
Violence) (contending that students "'are competing for 
scholarships and grants that are drying up'. . . with a resulting
reaction by whites against perceived rivals"); Mangan, At Texas: 
An Undercurrent of Hostility Amid Efforts to Promote
31
In addition, the current divisions in the understanding
of racism on university campuses serve as an accurate
paradigm for race issues in the larger, national context.
Today*s white students missed most of the civil rights
movement and legally enforced segregation. Many feel no
direct responsibility for institutionalized racism and
believe that with formal legal barriers to integration now
dismantled, students of color stand on an equal footing with
them. As Professor Fleming observed:
Most [students] would like to ignore the subject [of 
racism], just like most of society. That attitude is 
at the source of the racial incidents. The average 
student doesn't feel responsible for the racial climate 
or civil rights. They don't feel responsible for 
anything that they don't have direct knowledge of.
They have been taught systematically to ignore race as 
a subject.34
As with most white people generally, white students' 
conception of racism is constructed from the images that the 
civil rights movement confronted: enforced segregation,
Multiculturalism, Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 26, 1989, at A29, 
col. 1 (statement of Michael L. Davis, director of Minority 
Information Center, University of Texas-Austin) (noting that 
"[t]here is an undercurrent of antagonism, maybe even 
frustration, with programs and moneys specifically set aside for 
minorities, especially when money is tight"); Crenshaw, supra 
note 6, at 1380 (footnote omitted).
Professor Kennedy notes that many beneficiaries of 
affirmative action recognize that "merit" is "a malleable 
concept, determined not by immanent, preexisting standards but 
rather by the perceived needs of society," and rightly insist 
that "considering a black's race as part of the bundle of traits 
that constitute 'merit' is entirely appropriate." Kennedy, supra 
note 5, at 1333.
34 Quoted in Magner, Blacks and Whites on the Campuses: 
Behind Ugly Racist Incidents, Student Isolation and 
Insensitivity, Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 26, 1989, at Al, A29.
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physical violence, blatant hateful epithets, and an overt 
denial of racial equality.
With such barriers now either gone or greatly 
diminished, many whites tend to think that racism has 
largely disappeared, at least in any form that could serve 
as an impediment to opportunity and achievement. White 
students have a very hard time understanding how their 
predominantly white campuses can seem hostile to people of 
color; how their campus social life is a distinctly "white 
culture," even when the major institutions within it are not 
explicitly labeled the "white student union," "white student 
newspaper," or "white debating club." It does not occur to 
most white students that their indifference or hostility to 
the Martin Luther King national holiday, for example, is 
evidence of attitudes on racial issues that differ 
tremendously from their black colleagues. It does not occur 
to most white students that the major, campus-sponsored 
concerts of white music groups constitute distinctly white 
cultural events.35
A white University of Texas student voiced an attitude 
not uncommon among whites when he complained, "I don't like 
a black-student center any more than I would like a white-
35 Cf. B. Blauner, Black Lives, White Lives: Three Decades 
of Race Relations in America 3 (1989) (observing that although an 
"extremely significant achievement," the national celebration of 
Dr. King's birthday "makes it easier to avoid facing squarely the 
evils of racism, economic injustice, and war that he struggled 
against").
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student center." The hostility, or at least puzzlement, one 
hears among many white students toward distinctly black 
cultural centers, student groups, and social events arises 
from white students' lack of recognition that the 
overwhelmingly white campuses themselves are in some sense 
large white cultural centers— ones in which black students 
are likely to have difficulty feeling at home. Thus, white 
students' assertions that they only want all people treated 
the same, without the separatism of institutions such as 
black cultural centers, are often experienced by minority 
students as demands that they assimilate into white- 
dominated institutions and culture. That white norm extends 
even into the classroom.36
The reports of racist incidents on college campuses 
recur continually in the popular press. The National 
Institute Against Prejudice and Violence collected reports 
of seventy-eight incidents of racial violence or allegations 
of prejudice that occurred in the spring semester of 1988 
alone, and that did not purport to be a comprehensive 
survey. The recurrence of old-fashioned intentional racism 
on campuses is the most obvious form of hostility, and a 
sampling demonstrates the ferocity of some such incidents,
36 See Mangan, supra note 33, at A29, col. 2 (comment of 
University of Texas student). An overtly hostile reaction to 
black campus institutions is reported in Magner, supra note \33\, 
at A30, col. 1 (white students at Temple University form a "White 
Student Union," created "to oppose affirmative action and 
encourage white pride"). On racial dynamics in the classroom, 
see Crenshaw, supra note 8.
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which have variously involved: graffiti containing swastikas 
and antiblack epithets; cross-burning; the protesting of an 
all-white fraternity's "White History Week" party; the 
shouting of racial slurs; the distribution of openly hostile 
leaflets; racial brawls; and black student class boycotts 
and protests. The comprehensive list of such incidents is 
much longer, and that list does not include unreported 
incidents, which may well be the majority.37
37 See Academe, supra note 33, at 57 (reporting several 
incidents: black academic counselor finds words "death n-gger" 
scratched on office door; a wooden cross doused with fuel was 
found in front of the Black Cultural Center at Purdue University; 
whites shouted slurs at rally for Rev. Jesse Jackson at Northern 
Illinois University; at the University of Massachusetts, 1,500 
students "swirled into a white-black brawl" after the last game 
of the World Series; at the University of Michigan, leaflets 
appeared with the message "Get your black asses back to Africa"); 
Racism Flares on Campus, Time, Dec. 8, 1980, at 28 (black 
students at Williams College received messages such as "stinking 
black n-ggers"; Harvard University black student leader found 
racist phrases written on her office calendar; letter sent to a 
black student dormitory at Wesleyan University urged "wip[ing] 
all g.d. n-ggers off the face of the earth"); Aitken, supra note 
30, at 58 (white students at the Citadel dressed in sheets and 
burned a cross a black student's room); Horwitz, Black Students 
Protest GWU Party, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1987, at A15, col. 1 
("white history" party thrown during black history month); Doe v. 
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989) 
(leaflets on Michigan campus referred to black students as 
"saucer lips, porch monkeys, and jigaboos").
Black Students in Ohio Boycott Classes, Wash. Post, Apr. 12, 
1988, at A14, col. 2 [hereinafter Boycott] (black Denison 
University students boycott classes to protest what they 
perceived as lenient treatment of white students involved in a 
racial incident). Students at Penn State, Hampshire College, and 
University of Massachusetts have occupied college buildings in 
attempts to win redress for a variety of racial problems on their 
campuses. See 91 Protestors Arrested, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1988, 
at A4, col. 5 (Penn State sit-in); Students to Continue Racism 
Protest, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1988, at A16, col. 4 (occupation of 
campus building at Hampshire College); Protesting Students To 
Meet with Chancellor, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1988, at A10, col. 1 
(occupation of campus building at University of Massachusetts).
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Such blatant incidents frequently meet with some form 
of condemnation from college administrators, even though 
there is often disagreement on the appropriate punishment or 
remedial action when (and if) the perpetrators are caught. 
Such events are less problematic as an interpretive matter 
because they usually have clear perpetrators and obvious 
racist intent. Whites usually accept such incidents as 
racist, though they often differ from African Americans in 
their assessment of the incidents' effect, importance, and 
need for remedy. For instance, while many blacks tend to 
see racial incidents as evidence of a recurrent problem, and 
as the most overt manifestation of an attitude that takes 
many subtler forms, many whites tend to see such incidents 
as isolated aberrations that can be dismissed as the actions 
of kooks who should be ignored. They tend to view racial 
incidents on campus the way a federal judge described such 
incidents on the University of Michigan campus: "There was 
no evidence to suggest that these were anything other than 
isolated and purposeless acts." Regardless of what makes a 
series of events "isolated," acts such as distributing a
More comprehensive lists of such incidents can be found in 
Marcus, supra note 10, at 19 & table 2; Matsuda, Public Response 
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L.
Rev. 2320, 2333 n.71 (1989) (collecting a variety of incidents 
and examples of "hate speech"); Shenk, Young Hate, CV Mag., Feb. 
1990, at 34, 36-39 (chronicling 30 days of racial incidents in a 
"month in the life of campus bigotry" and reporting estimation of 
Howard Erlich of the National Institute Against Prejudice & 
Violence that "'up to 8 0 percent of harassed students don't 
report the harassment'").
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flier declaring "'open season1 on blacks," in which it 
referred to blacks as "saucer lips, porch monkeys, and 
jigaboos" were not purposeless. The clear intent was to 
demean and threaten black students, creating a hostile 
environment that they would want to leave, and an 
understanding that they were unwelcome if they chose to 
stay.38
As to forms of racism that are more frequent— the 
subtle manifestations of attitudes and preconceptions shaped 
by white race consciousness that materially affect 
institutional practices and interpersonal relations— there 
is even less recognition; there is disagreement over whether 
racism exists or has any effect at all. Black students 
often report they are "reminded every day" that they don't 
belong by low-key events such as whites saying "he speaks 
well for a black" or expressing "shock[] when I say 
something intelligent." Many white students frequently do 
not recognize the offensiveness of such reactions, one study 
reports they are much less aware than their black 
counterparts of blatant, public incidents of racism that 
occur on their campuses.39
38 Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. 
Mich. 1989) (emphasis added).
39 See Wilkerson, supra note 1, § 1, at 1, col. 4 and at 
34, col. 1 (reporting that "[sjeveral days spent with black 
students and faculty members at the University of Michigan showed 
that racism is a constant in their lives and takes an enormous 
psychic and emotional toll"); id. at § 1, at 34, col. 4 
(reporting on a recent study by Dr. Howard Erlich "of students at
37
One does not have to talk to many black college 
students before hearing stories about some suspicious 
official asking them to show IDs at the entrance of their 
own campus buildings because he suspected they did not 
belong there; of white students moving to a new seat when a 
black classmate sat too close; of black students rarely 
being invited to join study groups with whites; of white 
fraternity members handing out invitations on a campus 
sidewalk but not offering them to minority students. The 
phenomenology of black students' experience with racism on 
predominantly white campuses leaves little doubt of the 
existence and effect of subtle or unconscious racism, 
despite institutional policies of formal equality and racial 
neutrality.40 As one college administrator concluded:
the University of Maryland in Baltimore County, [where] two- 
thirds of white students said they had not heard about certain 
racial incidents on campus, while 80 percent of black students 
said they had").
40 See, e.g., Aitken, supra note 30, at 58 (black student 
at Yale says he is regularly stopped on campus and asked for 
identification, and comments "I expect it, but I don't accept 
it"); Wilkerson, supra note 1, § 1, at 34, col. 1 (University of 
Michigan student notes, "Sometimes [white students will] walk to 
the other side of the street if they see you coming, or they 
don't want to sit next to you in class"); Wright, Black History 
Month: Unconscious Racism at UVa Law, Va. L. Weekly, Feb. 10, 
1989, at 3, col. 3 (suggesting that whites' frequent 
categorization of all blacks as affirmative action beneficiaries 
along with the reluctance of many blacks to speak up in class, 
results "in fairly common exclusion of blacks from white study 
groups"); Magner, supra note 34, at A32, col. 1 (black students 
not handed invitations to open parties); Collison, Black Students 
Cite Finances as Chief Reason for Dropping Out, Oberlin Study 
Finds, Chron. of Higher Educ., Sept. 28, 1988, at A34 (citing 
Oberlin College study in which black students said "racial 
prejudice and discrimination inhibit[ed] their success as
38
[Black] [s]tudents are hard put to give you a specific, 
overt incident [of racial prejudice]. But what they 
share is their subtle experience of rejection based on 
color that many professors and white staff may not be 
aware that they are sending to the student.41
The complaints of minority scholars who experience 
racism as they try to forge careers in a university setting 
from which they have traditionally been excluded also belies 
the assumption that racism has been effectively eliminated 
among the enlightened elite of the academy, especially the 
faculty. A group of leading minority law professors has 
argued in an "Open Letter to Our Colleagues of the Majority 
Race" that "racial indifference or insensitivity, if not 
more overt racist motives, not only exists among white law 
professors, but is increasing." Most of the cosigners
students," and was one reason for dropping out).
Scholarly research confirms these anecdotal reports. See 
Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 
and 1964, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 673, 689 (1985) (reporting that 
"[r]esearch on nonverbal behavior shows that white college 
students often sit further away, use a less friendly voice tone, 
make less eye contact and more speech errors, and terminate the 
interview faster when interacting with a black rather than a 
white") (citation omitted); Weitz, Attitude, Voice and Behavior:
A Repressed Affect Model of Interracial Interaction, 24 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychology 14-20 (1972) (noting that in a 
study of behavior of whites interacting with blacks, "[e]xtremely 
favorable verbal attitudes were coupled with subtle signs of 
rejection of blacks); Word, Zanna & Cooper, Nonverbal Mediation 
of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. 
Exp. Soc. Psychology 109, 111-19 (1974) (arguing that a white 
person's expectations about a black person may influence the 
white's actions, and in turn induce the black to behave in a way 
that confirms the original false definition).
41 Collison, supra note 40, at A34, col. 4; cf. Lacayo, 
Between Two Worlds, Time, Mar. 13, 1989, at 58-68 (chronicling 
the subtle racial slights black professionals face in white- 
dominated middle-class life).
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stated that they had "experienced indignities at the hands 
of their white colleagues" and that they felt a sense of 
"decreasing institutional support and increasing challenges 
to our legitimacy as teachers in the classroom." 
Correspondingly, Professor Brooks has asserted that an 
"anti-minority mindset" is present among some white law 
professors that involves "a predisposition to assess 
minority performance in a negative or hypercritical fashion" 
and affects hiring and advancement of minority scholars, as 
well as the hospitality of both the institutions and 
profession in which they work.42
42 See Lacayo, supra note 41, at 66 (observing that "[a]t 
some colleges, black faculty feel so isolated that they have 
negotiated telephone allowances into their job contracts to help 
them stay in touch with blacks teaching at other campuses around 
the country"). For an argument that scholarly discourse is often 
presumed to be free of racial bias but often is not, see Kennedy, 
supra note 4, at 1338-39.
For the open letter from minority faculty, see Brooks, supra 
note 16, at 11. On Brooks' theory of the anti-minority mindset, 
see id. at 2-3.
For a report on the perspective of minority faculty 
generally, see Blum, Tenure Rates for Black Professors Found to 
Lag at White Institutions in 9 Southern States, Chron. of Higher 
Educ., Sept. 21, 1988, at A13, A13-14 (reporting that "[i]n 
overwhelmingly large percentages, black faculty members felt that 
there was insufficient minority faculty representation on faculty 
search committees, in their academic departments, and at their 
institutions as a whole").
Professor Delgado makes the related argument that elite 
white professors have made little use of civil rights scholarship 
written by minorities, members of the very groups that are the 
raison d'etre for such legal doctrine. Delgado's survey revealed 
that minority scholars are rarely cited by the most prominent 
white professors whose work dominates the field. Delgado, The 
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984).
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The difficulty of dealing with racism experienced by 
black students that arises from a white professor's 
antiminority mindset, selective indifference, and 
insensitivity is exacerbated by the tendency of university 
administrators often to acknowledge more quickly racially 
offensive behavior by students than by their colleagues. 
Also, the distribution of power between students and faculty 
compounds the problem; students fear retaliation in the form 
of classroom hostility, bad grades, poor recommendations, or 
worse, for confronting or reporting professors who make 
offensive remarks. That undoubtedly results in 
underreporting of racial tensions in the classroom.43
In numerous subtle ways, professors can demonstrate on 
campus and in the classroom an insensitivity that is 
experienced as hostility. In a particularly blatant 
incident, a University of Michigan dean publicly stated that 
although he agreed the college should pursue affirmative 
action goals, such efforts should avoid creating an 
institution to which "'minorities would naturally flock in
43 See D. Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of 
Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) (containing 
analysis of unequal institutional power between students and law 
faculty, and the corresponding effect on student-teacher 
relationships); Bell, Black Students in White Law Schools: The 
Ordeal and the Opportunity, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 539, 547 (noting 
that "frequently an insensitive teacher's remarks and conduct are 
borne in silent resentment"); Matsuda, supra note 37, at 2370 
n.249 ("The typical university student is emotionally vulnerable 
for several reasons. . . .  A negative environmental response 
during this period of experience could mar for life an 
individual's ability to remain open, creative, and risk- 
taking. ") .
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much greater numbers.f" It is hard not to see that 
statement as implying minority students are undesirable. In 
addition to such remarks, minority students may also face 
professors who publish papers that claim scientific proof of 
the intellectual inferiority of blacks, such as Jensen's 
infamous Harvard Education Review article, or a more recent 
one by a City University of New York professor.
Universities face an intractable tension between preserving 
at atmosphere open to all points of view and maintaining an 
environment in which all students are equally unburdened by 
attitudes of bias.44
Classroom episodes are usually more subtle. In some 
situations, letting pass without comment material such as 
old court cases in law school casebooks that contain racist 
language and assumptions can be offensive or uncomfortable 
for minority students. And the tone need not be as blatant
44 Dean's Remark Protested, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1988, at 
A18, col. 5; see D. Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest 
for Racial Justice (1987).
Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement? 
39 Harv. Educ. Rev. 1 (1969) ; Mooney, Controversial Professor 
Says CUNY Pressure to Quit Course Violated Academic Freedom, 
Chron. of Higher Educ., Nov. 23, 1988, at All, col 1 (noting 
philosophy professor Michael Levin's article in the Australian 
journal Quandrant, which asserted that "'there is now quite solid 
evidence . . . that the average black is significantly less 
intelligent than the average white"').
See also Ex-Baseball Official Slur Protested, Wash. Post, 
Apr. 7, 1988, at All, col. 3 (University of Kentucky trustee 
observed in a board meeting considering the school's divestment 
from South Africa that "Zimbabwe is all n-gger now"); Feinberg, 
Student Loan Crackdown Defended, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 1988, at 
A22, col. 1 (federal education official defends remark concluding 
that historically black colleges with higher-than-average student 
loan default rates '"contain a high level of thieves'").
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as that found in Plessv v. Ferguson or State v. Mann. Black 
students are less likely than whites to feel disconnected 
from (or not even to notice) behavior actions in court cases 
(or fiction, or historical narratives) that are clear 
examples of racial bias. In Davis v. Mississippi, the court 
recounted a police roundup, without warrants, of at least 24 
black youths, and interrogation of 40 or 50 others, after a 
rape victim "could give no better description of her 
assailant than that he was a Negro youth." Such action 
likely resonates with what some minority students may know 
first- or second-hand. Among a group of whites, an 
assumption may silently evolve that such tactics are 
sensible or necessary, whereas in a black-dominated room 
there would more likely be reaction to the event as 
unjustified and racially biased. Which attitude prevails in 
a college classroom reveals who is dominating the agenda and 
who is likely to sense alienation.45
Those racially tinged classroom dynamics can be set off 
in a variety of materials and discussions. Introducing the 
race of a defendant in a rape case or of the victimized 
party in an unconscionable contracts case as one who is 
illiterate and on welfare can palpably play on traditional 
racial mythologies of black sexuality and violence or 
ignorance and irresponsibility. In State v. Smith, the
45 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); State v. Mann,
13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 
722 (1969).
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court repeatedly referred to the defendant and other 
assailants as "the largest negro" and "the negroes," making 
the race of those parties the exclusive marker of their 
identity. Patricia Monture, a Native Canadian scholar, 
recounted a law school class in which a court opinion 
described a criminal defendant as "Indian," "drunk," and 
"illiterate," as if "all of that belongs in one mouthful." 
But unlike the classroom discussion of rape, during which 
the professor made an effort not "to inflict any harm on any 
women in the class," there was no mention of alienating 
power of the racial stereotype.46
At the University of Virginia, law students in a 
contracts class were concerned about the professor's 
treatment of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 
particularly the identification of the woman as "'probably 
black'" when her race was nowhere mentioned in the decision. 
The case involves a low-income woman who purchased items on 
credit pursuant to a contract that the court ruled was 
"unconscionable" and thus unenforceable by the merchant.
The white professor (and many white students) made the 
plausible argument that a defendant's race could be relevant 
to speculation on the motivations of a decisionmaker such as 
the merchant. Nevertheless, the assumption of race based in 
large part on such facts stated in the case as the debtor's
46 Smith v. State, 229 So. 2d 551, 553 (Miss. 1970).
Monture, Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah, Canadian J. Women 
& the Law 159, 164 (1986).
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poverty, illiteracy, and acceptance of welfare payments 
provided black students with a strong argument that the 
discussion was based on an offensive stereotype.47
The problem is the inevitability of history and 
context. Discussions of race take place amidst well known 
myths of racial characteristics that traditionally labeled 
blacks as ignorant, lazy, and irresponsible. The stereotype 
is perpetuated as individuality is diminished. There is 
probably no way to approach this topic that is not charged 
with racial tension. To ignore it is not to eliminate the 
problem; it is to give control of the classroom to those 
with the power to dictate that this issue of no concern.
The result is one version of the hegemony of a white racial 
perspective in the classroom, and, concomitantly, one 
version of racial subordination. A public confrontation of 
the debate at least acknowledges the problematic 
disagreement and allows some voice to each perspective.
Professor Brooks has made a related point. When 
"individuals or institutions having 'good' intentions engage 
in a pattern or practice of granting low priority to matters 
of keen importance to minorities . . . that is 
subordination, and, hence, racism as far as minorities are 
concerned." One of the central premises of this thesis is
47 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 
(D.C. Cir. 1965). For an account of student reaction to the 
discussion of Williams. see Va. L. Weekly, Apr. 22, 1988, at 1, 
col. 1.
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that the sincerity of white students and teachers is not 
always the issue. Often, whites' denial that they see 
racism in a situation where blacks complain of it is 
genuine. It is simply an interpretation of a social 
situation that has been formulated from a "second-hand" 
knowledge of racism at best, from the history of a group 
that has never experienced racial prejudice. It should be 
uncontroversial to assert that many whites have made little 
effort to understand the experience of their black 
counterparts. I do not argue that whites have an incapacity 
for empathy or understanding that could lead to a congruence 
of vision with people of color. But because white as a 
group, and white institutions, have not made much effort 
toward such an understanding, their protestations of 
innocence when blacks complain of racism receive a chilly 
reception. What students of color seek, I think, when they 
complain of racism in the university is not only prevention 
of similar incidents and perhaps punishment for past ones, 
but also for recognition of their experience of racism, for 
their understanding of racism that arises from being on its 
"receiving end."48
B. The Effects of Racism in the University
The daily repetition of subtle racism and subordination 
in the classroom and on campus can ultimately be, for
48 See Brooks, supra note 16, at 9-10.
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African Americans, more productive of stress, anxiety, and 
alienation than even blatant racist acts. One University of 
Colorado student expressed a common complaint. "When I go 
to class, . . . I ’m never just a student. I ’m always a 
black student. If a black issue comes up, I have to 
represent the black people." The subtle, institutional 
racism and white racial perspective that pervade 
predominantly white campuses should be viewed as an equal 
protection problem —  an infringement of black students' 
right to equal enjoyment of an education.49
When racially insensitive behavior occurs in the 
classroom or elsewhere in the university, black students (or 
other minority groups) are deprived of the opportunity to 
receive an education in an environment free of harassment, 
hurt, and humiliation. The perpetual lack of awareness 
that, for example, a "White History Week Party" or a Black 
Sambo caricature on a white fraternity's poster is offensive
49 Lederman, On a Campus That's Almost All White, Black 
Athletes and Non-Athletes Struggle to Cope with Isolation, Chron. 
of Higher Educ., Feb. 15, 1989, at A33, A35 (statement of black 
student at the University of Colorado) ; see also The Pull of 
Black Colleges, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1988, at B2, col. 4 
(statement of American Council on Education Official) ("'What 
concerns [black] students is the day-to-day hostility. When you 
are in a dorm and the white students don't speak to you. When 
you go to class, you become invisible, and then you answer a 
question and they ask, how did you know that. It leaves the 
students exhausted."); School Colors, supra note 10, at 17, col.
3 (statement of professor of Afro-American Studies) ("I feel 
racism all around me. . . . But it's hard to pin down. It's
like AIDS. Ask most people if there's an AIDS problem, and 
they'll say they don't feel it. But people who have AIDS say 
otherwise.").
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to black students is a clear indication that black
perspectives are not part of the campus culture or community
consciousness. Black students may attend class (and take
exams) having just confronted offensive reminders of either
overt racial hostility or subtle racial insensitivity—
perhaps in the campus newspaper, on posters at the bus stop,
the structure of classroom discussion— that serve as
distractions from academic performance that white students
do not endure. Institutions premised on a white norm must
be continually reminded, on occasions when the white norm
manifests itself too blatantly, that their lack of awareness
is not harmless.50
Language has the power to cause injury. Professor
Fraser has put the point this way:
Control over language is power . . . .  The ability to 
create, disseminate and alter discourse is essential to 
the exercise of hegemonic power. A group can control 
experience by controlling discourse and language for 
through language we understand, articulate and indeed 
experience experience.51
50 See Cavalier Daily, supra note 2, at 1, col. 3. An all- 
white fraternity advertised a party using a poster illustrated 
with a "Fiji islander" caricature (resembling Black Sambo art) 
standing near a sign warning that no "short wops" and "nega 
babes" would be allowed into the party. After black students 
complained, the fraternity president lamented, "It bothers us 
that we have to defend ourselves against racism when we know we 
are not racist."
51 See Fraser, What's Love Got to Do With It?: Critical 
Legal Studies, Feminist Discourse, and the Ethic of Solidarity, 
11 Harv. Women's L.J. 53 (1988) (footnote omitted); see also 
Matsuda, supra note 37, at 23 35 ("From the victim's perspective, 
[a variety of overt and covert means of expressing racism, 
including sanitized racist comments] inflict wounds, wounds that 
are neither random nor isolated.").
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Language and behavior that demonstrate an obliviousness to 
minority communities stigmatize those communities and 
marginalize individuals' value as community members. As 
institutional practices they marginalize black concerns and 
perspectives and hinder black students' participation in 
community life because they are implicitly excluded from 
fully contributing to the creation of community norms, 
values, assumptions, and perspectives. Toleration of racial 
insensitivity "den[ies] recognition to sensibilities 
essential to [black students'] identities [and] fails to 
respect their personhood." Racial insensitivity diminishes 
the equal standing of some community members, and thereby 
diminishes the ideal of equality that is the community's 
foundation.52
A notorious and much-discussed example was the incident 
arising from Harvard Law Professor Derrick Bell's visiting 
professorship at Stanford Law School in 1986. After white 
students complained that Bell's constitutional law course 
lacked "balance" because of the attention Bell gave to
52 Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 
Harv. L. Rev. 682, 691 (1988) (noting, id. at 690, "[r]eligious 
and racial affiliations are central to the identities of many 
individuals.").
Racial identities lead to distinct minority experiences in 
integrated universities. See accounts of black students in Yale 
Alumni Mag., May 1969, quoted in 1 The University Crisis Reader 
385-86 (I. Wallerstein & P. Starr eds. 1971) (One student 
suggests, "Yale can do some things for blacks? one thing Yale 
can't do is provide inspiration for blacks." Id. at 386.). For 
evidence that times have not changed, see Wilkerson, supra note 1 
and accompanying text.
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issues of race and slavery, the faculty organized several 
11 enrichment11 lectures to "supplement” Bell's teaching. Bell 
was not informed of the student complaints nor of the 
purpose of the lecture series, which was canceled after 
Stanford's black law student group protested.53 White 
faculty took the word of their white students — rather than 
their black colleague— that Bell's course was not 
"balanced," meaning that it was not "neutral" according to 
traditional curricular priorities practiced by white 
professors. The result was a confrontation that ended in a 
humiliating experience for the Stanford faculty as well as 
Bell.
The racial dynamic— arising out of occasional blatant 
racism, recurrent subtle remarks or unconscious behavior, 
and an ever-present hegemony of an institutionalized white 
norm and racial perspective— conspires to create a 
cognizable injury to black students in predominantly white 
schools. It alters students' conditions of education just 
as courts have recognized racial harassment on the job 
alters conditions of employment. Racism adds to the stress 
and anxiety that diminish any person's ability and desire to 
excel in an academic environment, especially one leading to 
a professional world known to contain further racial 
roadblocks to career advancement and hospitable working
53 For a more detailed account of the incident, see Brooks, 
supra note 16, at 1-2.
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conditions. The racial dynamic to which black students are 
subjected at predominantly white colleges contributes to 
stress that has a detrimental effect on personal well-being 
as well as academic performance.54
Such an injury is exactly the one found cognizable 
under Title VII for employees who endure racial harassment 
on the job; psychological well-being is statutorily 
protected. It is also in effect the same injury that the
54 Racial harassment that creates a hostile work atmosphere 
has been found to alter the terms or conditions of employment in 
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, 
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
See Fleming, Stress and Satisfaction in College Years of 
Black Students, 50 J. Negro Educ. 307, 318 (1981):
The results [of a study designed to locate some of the 
sources of black students' stress and satisfaction] suggest 
that students in a white urban university may divert energy 
away from intellectual mastery toward filling the 
interpersonal void created by the alienation and loneliness 
of being black on a white college campus.
See also Fleming, Blacks in College (1984), cited in Wash. Post, 
Nov. 11, 1988, at B2, col. 4 (study concluded black students show 
more intellectual growth and do better at black colleges than at 
predominantly white schools).
For a revealing personal account of the operation and 
effects of racial dynamics in an academic setting, see Monture 
supra note 46, at 163-66.
The self-defense or survival mechanisms that black students 
develop are not, as Professor Bell has argued, "conducive to the 
intensive, purposeful effort needed to succeed in law school. 
These attitudes are actually detrimental, constituting the most 
serious deprivation the black student faces," a handicap "growing 
out of the black student's highly developed sensitivity to racist 
viewpoints . . . ." Bell, supra note 43, at 548.
Low expectations of minority students from faculty and other 
students can lead, for a variety of reasons, to self-fulfilling 
prophecies. See generally R. Rosenthal & L. Jacobson, Pygmalion 
in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual 
Development (1968) (discussing how teachers' expectations for 
students affect student performance).
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United States Supreme Court found to be caused by
segregation in Brovn v* Board of Education: "a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community," which may
H,affect[] the motivation of [black students] to learn . . .
and to deprive them of some of the benefits'" they would
enjoy in an educational setting free of racial harassment
and subordination.55
Language and behavior that arises from a lack of
awareness of particular racial perspectives (within a larger
institutional white norm that denies its own racial
nonneutrality) hinders minority students' participation and
opportunity in the university. The resulting racial tension
and occasional hostility, in addition to the preexisting
conflict in racial viewpoints, further preclude the
possibility, for all races, of race-neutral behavior.
Institutional racism requires an institutional commitment to
recognition and remedy:
Official tolerance of racist speech in [the university] 
setting is more harmful than generalized tolerance in 
the community-at-large. It is harmful to student 
perpetrators in that it is a lesson in getting-away- 
with-it that will have lifelong repercussions. It is 
harmful to targets, who perceive the university as 
taking sides through inaction, and who are left to
55 Text of Title VII is at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 
(1981)? see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 
1971), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (holding Title VII 
protects "employees psychological as well as economic" rights and 
"the emotional and psychological stability of minority group 
workers"); Davis, Race Harassment Discrimination: A Problem that 
Won't Go Away?, 10 Empl. Relations L.J. 415, 418 (1985).
Quotation is found in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483, 494 (1954).
their own resources in coping with the damage wrought 
Finally, it is a harm to the goals of inclusion, 
education, development of knowledge, and ethics that 
universities exist and stand for. 6
56 Matsuda, supra note 37, at 2371; see also id. at 2339; 
Delgado, supra note 44, at 137.
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IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR REMEDIAL ACTION
A. Strategies to Sanction Racist Speech and Behavior 
The most egregious forms of racist language and 
behavior— the forms closest to traditional intentional 
racism— can be combated with traditional legal sanctions. 
One promising route for expansion of existing options would 
be legislation covering university students and mirroring 
Title VII imposition of liability for contributing to 
racially hostile environments. Federal courts have 
vindicated claims of a "hostile environment" caused by 
racial or sexual harassment as a form of race or sex 
discrimination actionable under Title VII. The United 
States Supreme Court also has imposed liability for 
"toleration and tacit encouragement of racial harassment" 
after finding that a labor union failed in its "affirmative 
duty to combat employer discrimination in the workplace."57
57 For an excellent summary of existing legal remedies 
available to combat racial harassment on campus, see Note,
Student Discriminatory Harassment, 16 J.C.U.L. 311, 314-19 (1989) 
(identifying the utility of federal statutes including 18 U.S.C.
§ 245 (1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982)).
For Title VII hostile environment cases, see Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual harassment); Rogers v. 
EEOC, 454 F .2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 
957 (1972) (racial harassment).
See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665-67 (1987) 
(liability for union's "toleration" of and failure to combat 
employer bias).
Walter B. Connolly, Jr., an attorney speaking to the 
National Association of University Attorneys, warned that 
universities could be held liable under recent Supreme Court
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Students are, in all relevant respects, in an identical 
situation to employees. They are subordinates with an 
economic need to remain in the institution (on the job), are
vulnerable to dismissal from superiors, and have little
\
power within the institution to react against racial 
harassment from coequals or superiors. Their only recourse 
when confronted with problems is to quit, to use 
institutional policies, or to seek legal remedy. The scope 
of such a remedy, however, would be limited. For the 
university to be liable for student behavior under a Title 
VII model, the administration would have to be aware of, and 
yet not have tried to stop or punish, racial harassment.
Another option would be sanctions for intentionally 
racist insults, such as those proposed by Professors Delgado 
and Matsuda. Professor Delgado's proposal for a tort action 
imposing liability for intentional racial insults would be 
as feasible a tool to fight campus-based racism as it would 
be against racism generally. As he defines it, the cause 
of action would require the plaintiff to prove that 
"[ljanguage was addressed to him or her by the defendant 
that was intended to demean through reference to race; that 
the plaintiff understood as intended to demean through 
reference to race; and that a reasonable person would
Title VII doctrine for not effectively combating racial 
harassment on campus. Fields, Colleges Advised to Develop Strong 
Procedures to Deal With Incidents of Racial Harassment, Chron. of 
Higher Educ., July 20, 1988, at All.
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recognize as a racial insult." And Professor Matsuda has 
recently argued for a narrow criminal statute to punish 
intentionally racist speech. Her proposal would limit guilt 
to cases in which "[t]he message is of racial inferiority[,]
. . . is directed against a historically oppressed group[,].
. . [and] is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading."58
Finally, there is the option of institutional remedies 
for racially offensive speech and behavior, an option with 
which several universities are now struggling. In Doe v. 
University of Michigan, a federal district court struck down 
the University of Michigan's policy to combat campus racial 
harassment, finding that it violated the first amendment on 
vagueness and overbreadth grounds.59
The court's reasoning suggested the constitutional 
limits of any university policy, and thus the limited 
utility of such a policy for addressing the varieties of 
racial tension on campuses. First, any limitation on speech
58 For Delgado's seminal study of the tort for racial 
insults, see Delgado, supra note 44, at 179. He collects a wide 
array of evidence to suggest that such insults produce 
psychological, sociological, and political harms that merit legal 
protection, and that they are at least on par with other 
cognizable inflictions of severe emotional distress. Id. at 135- 
49.
For Matsuda's proposal, see Matsuda, supra note 37, at 23 56- 
58, 2370-73.
59 Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 861-67 
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
In addition to the University of Michigan policy, policies 
have been debated or enacted at Stanford University, the 
University of Wisconsin, and at the State University of New York- 
Buff alo Law School. Copies are on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association.
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that includes the threat of formal, institutional sanctions 
cannot be applied to speech that "disseminates ideas" or to 
statements that are made in the course of classroom academic 
discussions. The Doe court cited Michigan's resolution of 
complaints against students making offensive remarks in the 
classroom as examples of the policy's overbreadth and 
infringement on protected speech (even though the University 
did not apply formal sanctions in any of the three cases 
cited by the court). Thus, a university could not formally 
punish statements motivated by racism when they are 
purportedly part of a serious idea or theory offered in the 
university classroom or other formal forum. (The University 
of Michigan policy excluded from regulation anything 
published in university-sponsored publications such as the 
Michigan Daily newspaper.) The Doe court implied, however, 
that a university might be able to sanction "conduct such as 
racial slurs and epithets in the classroom directed at an 
individual victim."60
Second, the Doe court ruled that the Michigan policy 
was too vague, saying "it was simply impossible to discern .
. . any conceptual distinction between protected and
unprotected conduct." The court found the policy's 
requirements that sanctionable language "'stigmatize'" or 
"'victimize'" an individual, and "'involve an express or 
implied threat to an individual's academic efforts,'" to be
60 721 F. Supp. at 864-68.
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unconstitutionally vague. It said that those terms "elude 
precise definition," and that "[i]t is not clear what kind 
of conduct would constitute a 'threat1 to an individual's 
academic efforts."61
(The plaintiff in Doe was a graduate student in 
"biopsychology," whose study focused on "controversial 
theories positing biologically-based differences between 
sexes and races [that] might be perceived as 'sexist' and 
'racist' by some students, and he feared that discussion of 
such theories might be sanctionable" under the university's 
antidiscrimination policy. Such offensive but academically 
oriented discussion is clearly what the court was most 
interested in excluding from any chilling effects of an 
antidiscrimination policy.62)
Thus, if Doe represents the interpretation of current 
first amendment doctrine that universities will face in 
combating racist conduct, it is clear that even a revised, 
more carefully crafted antiracism policy could not reach 
more subtle forms of racism with formal sanctions, 
especially in the classroom. Universities, then, will have 
to develop two-part policies. One part can address 
egregious, blatant speech and conduct that is legally 
sanctionable under the first amendment. Universities have 
taken a variety of actions to discipline racially offensive
61 Id. at 867.
62 Id. at 858.
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behavior by students, including suspensions, mandatory 
community service, and mandatory attendance at racial 
sensitivity seminars, that could be incorporated into such a 
policy. When dealing with student groups such as 
fraternities, a university could revoke charters or deny 
privileges granted by the university, such as permission to 
use campus meeting rooms and other facilities.
In comparatively rare cases, colleges have reprimanded 
such behavior by faculty as well, with public reprimands, 
prohibitions on teaching certain courses, and even 
suspension. At the City University of New York, for 
example, the Faculty Senate of City College (at which 40% of 
the students are black) passed a resolution "disavow[ing] 
and reject[ing] the abhorrent sentiments" of a professor who 
published an article asserting that "the average black is 
significantly less intelligent than the average white." 
Schools can also employ a variety of other sanctions against 
faculty: a bar from teaching certain classes, temporary 
suspensions, a letter noting the incident placed in the 
professor's permanent file, a mandatory apology, and 
temporary ineligibility for research funding, sabbaticals, 
or merit-based salary increases.63
63 See Mooney, supra note 44, at All; see also Raphael, 
T.A.'s 'Racist' Remark Results in Firing, The Nat'l College 
Newspaper, Oct. 1989, at 2 (University of Maryland teaching 
assistant fired for describing student's classroom performance as 
"typically black"); cf. Winfrey v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 467 
F. Supp. 56, 60 (D. Neb. 1979) (letter placed in file of foreman 
by employer as part of sanction for racially insensitive remark
59
The second part of an institutional policy would aim to 
deter nonsanctionable and more subtle conduct that is 
nevertheless offensive, i.e., behavior that will never be 
reached by formal adjudication but which the university 
needs to recognize, condemn, and discourage. The 
development of this second aspect of an antiracism policy 
will be the more difficult to formulate. Yet, to recognize 
only deliberate, intentional racism is to give to deny the 
injurious force of subtle racism and an institutional white 
norm. The absence of such a policy signals that the 
community— more specifically the dominant forces within it—  
does not care about other forms of racism that continue to 
permeate university life and subordinate minority interests. 
Such a policy also would serve the educative function of the 
criminal law; it would express a societal judgment on the 
inappropriateness of some behavior, and define such behavior 
as beyond collective norms.64
Universities can formulate a wide variety of responses 
to nonsanctionable behavior. A "minority concerns" 
committee could, for instance, approach a professor or 
student whose conduct in the classroom had offended a 
community member, make the offender aware of the offense
to an employee).
64 See generally E. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in 
Society 39 (W.D. Halls trans. 1984) (stating that "an act is 
criminal when it offends the strong, well-defined states of the 
collective consciousness").
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while preserving the complainants anonymity, and ask to 
meet with the offender. It could ask for an apology or 
voluntary attendance at a racial awareness seminar. Such a 
committee could also periodically and publicly report the 
type of offensive incidents and behavior that minority 
community members experience, in an effort to raise 
awareness and spark discussion of the type of offenses 
minorities suffer on campus. Finally, universities can 
make— and in some cases have made— affirmative use of their 
first amendment prerogatives, publicly and officially 
condemning offensive behavior that they are otherwise unable 
to sanction.65
There will no doubt be charges that drawing attention 
to and institutionally responding to subtle, racially
65 The University of Michigan developed an "interpretive 
guide" to supplement its antidiscrimination policy, which was 
condemned by the Doe court as including constitutionally 
protected behavior. Examples from the guide included: "A male 
student makes remarks in class like 'Women just aren't as good in 
this field as men,' thus creating a hostile learning atmosphere 
for female classmates. Students in a residence hall have a floor 
party and invite everyone on their floor except one person 
because they think she might be a lesbian. . . . You display a
confederate flag on the door of your room in the residence hall."
Doe. 721 F. Supp. at 857-58.
For an affirmative use a universities first amendment rights 
to fight racial harassment see, e.g., Brown U. to Strengthen 
Rules Against Racism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1989, at B8, col. 1 
(describing Brown University president's response to racist 
incidents on campus, which included a promise to strengthen 
policies against racism, a public condemnation of "those who 
would attempt to disrupt our university and poison our 
community," and a letter sent to all parents of Brown students 
promising to prosecute and expel students responsible for racial 
harassment if caught).
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charged remarks made during the course of classroom 
discussion will "chill" discussion of sensitive topics by 
students and faculty. But such a concern must be weighed in 
light of the fact that the discourse of black students and 
other offended groups who suffer the offense of such remarks 
and endure an uncomfortable or hostile classroom and campus 
atmosphere is already being chilled. Their participation, 
their points of view— including the view that certain 
remarks are offensive— are marginalized, devalued, made more 
difficult and less legitimate to express. The issue is not 
simply one of punishing offensive behavior versus free 
expression; it is also a question of whose expression will 
be most privileged by institutional structures.
Universities make decisions about the value of speech 
and ideas every day in their decisions to hire and tenure 
some faculty members rather than others, to fund some 
research and teaching programs rather than others. Choosing 
to fund, say, an early American history program instead of 
an African American history program means that the 
university considers the former to be more valuable. But 
there is no reason an institution cannot similarly express 
its disdain for expression by faculty and students that is 
racially offensive.
An affirmative strategy to make racist expression 
unwelcome and uncomfortable could work in conjunction with 
the many other educative efforts aimed at eliminating white
62
cultural hegemony on campus. A sampling of such efforts 
might include: working toward curriculum diversity and the 
inclusion of minority writers in "core" reading lists; 
periodic programs to promote racial awareness, including 
cultural awareness seminars or public debates on racially 
charged subjects for students and faculty; and permanent 
campus hotlines to which students and others can report 
racially offensive incidents.66
All that, however, is likely to bring about fundamental 
change in university race relations only in concert with a 
more basic restructuring that empowers the black community 
to define a portion of institutional life according to its 
own racial norm and perspective. That was the aim of 
Vincent Harding's proposal for "The Institute of the Black 
World," which was designed to respond to "our own 
[predominantly black] institutions being destroyed" and 
would have been "a place where Black students and professors 
who went to [elite, predominantly white universities] could 
spend a year in a predominantly Black academic setting." It 
is also the central purpose of historically black colleges.
66 See Detlefsen, supra note 10 (chronicling, though 
commenting negatively upon, Harvard University's "Actively 
Working Against Racism and Ethnocentrism" (AWARE) week); Mangan, 
supra note 33, at A32, col. 3 (noting that the University of 
Texas plans to offer a program of multiculturalism for all 
entering freshmen during orientation session); Fields, supra note 
56, at A12, col. 5 (attorney specializing in equal-employment 
litigation recommends "yearly training programs for 
administrators, faculty members, and students to raise people's 
awareness and sensitivity about racial harassment").
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The ability of a black community to achieve such an 
assertion of identity depends, however, on all groups 
recognizing that white-defined "neutral" perspectives are, 
instead, often white-dominated racial perspective to which 
there are alternatives.67
B. An Alternative Strategy
Punitive strategies such as sanctions on speech do not 
address the root of racial tensions in that they react to 
racial incidents without challenging the causes. There is 
an obvious need to do more than simply punish blatant racist 
behavior and mediate less blatant controversies. If white 
universities will recognize why black students feel that 
white universities are not "their place," and if they can 
recognize complaints about classroom dynamics and the need 
for black cultural institutions on campus, universities can 
go a lot further toward structuring themselves in a manner 
that gives black students an educational experience
67 See Lawrence, Education for Black Power in the Eighties: 
Present Day Implications of the Bakke Decision, 10 Nat'l Black 
L.J. 58, 62-63 (1987).
The preservation of a distinctly black academic environment 
was the aim of students at North Carolina Central University who 
wrote an editorial in their campus newspaper, titled "Is NCCU 
Still a Black School," opposing the "rapidly growing white 
population on our campus." The paper's editors argued, "[b]lack 
students on this campus have never made it clear . . . that we
are indeed separate from [white students] . . . and "[u]ntil we 
assume the role of a strong, proud people we will continue to be 
co-opted." The university administration sought to deny funding 
to the newspaper in response to the editorial, and the dispute 
ended up in federal court. See Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 
458 (4th Cir. 1973).
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equivalent to that of white students.
Change based on such recognition, however, is only part 
of the equation. The academy must also address why many 
white students themselves have so little understanding of 
the need for distinctly black institutions and why some 
white students feel so threatened by such institutions that 
they want to form "white student unions," fly Confederate 
flags, or voice resentment of affirmative action plans and 
black students' complaints about classrooms.
As Professor Crenshaw notes, black students requesting 
more minority professors and curricula adjustments are 
voicing a deeper dissatisfaction with their experience in 
white institutions. Black students do not want black 
professors simply to satisfy a need for role models, though 
that is important. Black professors, along with substantive 
curriculum changes and African-American social institutions, 
are likely to create a classroom experience that even well- 
intentioned white teachers often cannot. That is because 
the cultural assumptions and lived experience that go into 
forming the presuppositions and perspectives on classroom 
issues are not largely matters of intention. They are 
matters of culture, of social history, of whatever the 
descriptive term that characterizes the difference between 
white and black experiences in America such that the races
65
create divergent interpretations of the same event.68
It is up to our universities to help white students 
realize that their institutions are not culturally and 
racially neutral, and that minority students have an equal 
right to institutional structures and practices informed by 
their own experience and history. At the same time, 
however, it will not be a sustainable arrangement to force 
whites into a posture of perpetual guilt and contrition; 
such a development would likely result either in a barrier 
to interracial communication, because well-intentioned 
whites would be overcautious in broaching any racially 
tinged topic, or in further backlash by those who feel no 
personal guilt. Efforts are needed by white students and 
faculty to reformulate white self-awareness toward a more 
secure identity that is not threatened by black cultural 
institutions and that can recognize the racial nonneutrality 
of the institutions which whites dominate.
Thus, an alternative strategy for combating racial 
tension on campuses would include a restructuring of the 
university to give minority students as much of a feeling of 
belonging, as much of a feeling that the university is 
"their place," as white students usually experience. The
68 Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1-2; see also Bell, The Price 
and Pain of Racial Perspective, Stan. L. Sch. J., May 9, 1986, at 
5 (describing the unfavorable reaction of students and faculty to 
Professor Derrick Bell's teaching, in which he "tr[ied] to bring 
to my classrooms . . .  my experience and perspective as a black 
man in this country").
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strategy would include substantially increasing the number 
of black faculty members so that the experience in many 
classrooms is no longer premised on an unspoken norm of 
white race experience. It would likely include increasing 
other minority-focused institutions on campus, such as 
cultural centers and events, African-American study 
programs, and perhaps even separate disciplinary procedures, 
since it is a common complaint from minority students that 
official (even student-run) disciplinary systems 
disproportionately and unfairly sanction minority students. 
It would include, in short, the power to define a portion of 
institutional life by a black norm, a black race 
consciousness, concomitant to the white norm with which 
white students and teachers now (mostly unconsciously) 
infuse campus and classroom experience.69
69 See, e.g., Honor Seeks More Diversity, Cavalier Daily, 
Oct. 10, 1989, at 1 (reporting on Honor Committee's Minority 
Concerns Team status report and efforts "to improve and establish 
a more positive [minority] presence" in the honor system).
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V. CONCLUSION
Racism must be struggled against not only through the 
formal procedure of a committee for complaints (although 
establishing a committee will serve as a signal of 
institutional commitment). Universities must grapple with 
racism through the recognition of the distinct groups within 
the community and of their struggles for power, including 
the power to define racism and its injury— and to impose a 
cultural norm that will be the premise of classroom debate 
as well as social life. Universities must also acknowledge 
the relevance of race to aspects of the institution, 
particularly classroom pedagogy, in which a "norm of 
perspectivelessness" now prevails that denies the relevance 
of "individual values, experiences, and world views" to 
classroom discussion and textual interpretation.70
Competing conceptions of what racism is and efforts to 
structure institutional and social life around one or more 
of those conceptions are arenas of struggle. With a 
normative commitment to empower those whose experience has 
not previously informed university life, the dominant group- 
-here, whites— can achieve a better understanding of others' 
experience. The project will require a dialogue free from 
suspicion and committed to empathy— "a sentiment of
70 See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 2-3.
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community strong enough to enable each group to entrust its 
fate to the good faith and decency of the other."71
Recognizing that the issues of race do not always 
accuse the individual of deliberate racist intent, we can 
begin to reform institutions in which the repression of 
race-specific experience will be replaced by acknowledgement 
and empowerment of it. By granting black people the power 
to shape, influence, and control university life in the same 
way whites now do, black students will not have to depend 
solely on the good faith and commitment of whites to enforce 
antiracism policies as the primary remedy of racial tension. 
By acknowledging and fostering distinct, multiple racial 
perspectives instead of seeking a nonexistent neutral, race- 
free perspective as the premise of institutional life, 
minority students will be able to participate in a 
university that is as much theirs as it is their white 
counterparts *.
71 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1345; see generally Crenshaw, 
supra note 6, at 1370-76 (discussing "the Politics of 
Otherness").
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